



Be nice if you have to : the neurobiological roots of
strategic fairness
Citation for published version (APA):
Strang, S., Gross, J., Schuhmann, T., Riedl, A. M., Weber, B., & Sack, A. T. (2015). Be nice if you have to
: the neurobiological roots of strategic fairness. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 10(6), 790-
796. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsu114





Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Document license:
Taverne
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.




Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 03 Nov. 2021
Be nice if you have to  the neurobiological roots of
strategic fairness
Sabrina Strang,1,* Jörg Gross,2,3,* Teresa Schuhmann,2 Arno Riedl,3,4,5 Bernd Weber,1,6 and Alexander T. Sack2
1Center for Economics and Neuroscience, University of Bonn, 53127 Bonn, Germany, 2Department of Cognitive Neuroscience, Faculty of
Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands, 3Department of Economics (AE1), School of Business
and Economics, Maastricht University, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands, 4Center for Economic Studies (CESifo), 81679 München,
Germany, 5Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), 53113 Bonn, Germany and 6Department of Epileptology, University Hospital Bonn, 53105 Bonn,
Germany
Social norms, such as treating others fairly regardless of kin relations, are essential for the functioning of human societies. Their existence may explain
why humans, among all species, show unique patterns of prosocial behaviour. The maintenance of social norms often depends on external enforcement,
as in the absence of credible sanctioning mechanisms prosocial behaviour deteriorates quickly. This sanction-dependent prosocial behaviour suggests
that humans strategically adapt their behaviour and act selfishly if possible but control selfish impulses if necessary. Recent studies point at the role of
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in controlling selfish impulses. We test whether the DLPFC is indeed involved in the control of selfish impulses
as well as the strategic acquisition of this control mechanism. Using repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation, we provide evidence for the causal role
of the right DLPFC in strategic fairness. Because the DLPFC is phylogenetically one of the latest developed neocortical regions, this could explain why
complex norm systems exist in humans but not in other social animals.
Keywords: decision-making; prosocial behaviour; strategic fairness; social norms
INTRODUCTION
Humans among all animals are unique in their ability to establish
highly complex social norm systems (Tomasello and Rakoczy, 2003;
Fehr and Rockenbach, 2004; Gintis, 2003; Ostrom, 2000; Sethi and
Somanathan, 1996; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). Fairness and cooper-
ation norms often demand to restrict immediate self-interest in favour
of benefits of the group, the society or another individual in need. The
widespread prevalence of such norms in human societies is puzzling
from an evolutionary perspective (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Melis
and Semmann, 2010), as they are informal, often vaguely defined and,
as such, should be easy to circumvent. Especially in large groups with
anonymous interactions, free-riding should dominate (Bowles and
Gintis, 2003). Indeed, experiments have shown that without credible
punishment threats, fair and cooperative behaviour, like sharing with
others or contributing to a group project, can deteriorate quickly (Fehr
and Gächter, 2002; Egas and Riedl, 2008; Gächter et al., 2008; Ule et al.,
2009). On the other hand, there is convincing evidence that fair and
cooperative behaviour can emerge and be maintained when there is the
threat that freeriding will be sanctioned (Fehr and Gächter, 2000, 2002;
Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Spitzer et al., 2007; Egas and Riedl, 2008;
Gächter et al., 2008; Ule et al., 2009). This indicates that humans are
sensitive to punishment threats, enabling them to act selfishly when
they can and to act strategically fairly when they have to.
The neurobiological basis of this ability to adapt behaviour strategic-
ally and thereby controlling immediate selfish impulses has been
explored in recent studies. These suggest that activity in the right pre-
frontal cortex is associated with the control of selfish impulses (Wout
et al., 2005; Knoch et al., 2006; Knoch and Fehr, 2007; Knoch et al., 2009)
and the ability to adapt behaviour strategically (Spitzer et al., 2007; Ruff
et al., 2013). Knoch et al. (2006) found that the disruption of the right
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), using transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS), led participants to accept an offer that yielded a
higher financial payoff for themselves much more frequently than to
reject it in favour of a financially less attractive but fair outcome. A
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study by Spitzer et al.
(2007) showed that acting fairly because of strategic reasons is corre-
lated with increased activity in the right DLPFC. Most recently, using
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), Ruff et al. (2013)
demonstrated that suppressing neural excitability (with cathodal
tDCS) of the right lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) led to a lower
degree of strategic fairness, whereas enhancing neural excitability
(with anodal tDCS) of the right LPFC increased strategically fair be-
haviour. Interestingly, cathodal tDCS over right LPFC also decreased
immediate selfish responses, while enhancing the right LPFC using
anodal tDCS led to a higher degree of immediate selfishness.
This result pattern is intriguing and yet puzzling at the same time.
The fact that suppressing neural activity of the right LPFC with cath-
odal tDCS decreases immediate selfishness is in conflict with an earlier
result of Knoch et al. (2006) who found an increase of immediate
selfishness when disrupting the dorsal part of the right LPFC using
repetitive TMS (rTMS). However, these two studies differ in various
methodological aspects, which might account for this apparent contra-
diction. Ruff et al. (2013) applied a different intervention method and
used a broader target region. The strength of the study by Ruff et al.
(2013) clearly lies in the differential effects revealed on strategic fair-
ness as well as immediate selfishness contrasting anodal (enhancing) vs
cathodal (suppressing) tDCS over the same brain region, i.e. the right
LPFC. This focus on the right LPFC naturally neglected the possible
contribution of and comparison with left LPFC, as tested, e.g.in Knoch
et al. (2006). Moreover, all mentioned studies used between-subject
experimental designs, which allow inferences on the population level
but do not allow investigating individual differences in these effects
across stimulation conditions. Hence, although these studies strongly
suggest that the right LPFC is functionally relevant for decisions that
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involve trade-offs between immediate selfish goals on the one hand
and fair and cooperative behaviour on other hand, it remains necessary
to further investigate to what extent the right, and not the left, LPFC is
involved in controlling immediate selfish impulses and strategically fair
behaviour. In the current study we used a within-subject design apply-
ing rTMS (or sham) either to the right or left DLPFC of male partici-
pants in order to test on the individual level whether the right and/or
left DLPFC are causally linked to, first, the control of immediate self-
ishness and, second, the strategic acquisition of this control mechan-
ism when the threat of norm enforcement demands it. Moreover, to
explore whether a shift in beliefs or perception could explain the re-
sults, we elicited participants’ beliefs about norm enforcement and
perception of the fairness of behaviours while under the different
TMS and sham conditions.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
We studied 17 male participants (mean age 23.5 years, ranging between
20 and 41 years) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no
history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. None of the partici-
pants had taken part in a TMS experiment before. They received med-
ical approval for participation and gave written informed consent after
being instructed about the procedure. The study was approved by the
local Medical Ethical Commission.
TMS-procedure
Participants were tested in four sessions separated by at least 1 week. In
the first session a T1-weighted magnetic resonance image was
acquired. The other three sessions were TMS sessions. Each participant
took part in each of the three TMS conditions (left DLPFC, right
DLPFC and sham). The condition order was counterbalanced across
participants.
A surface reconstruction on the MRI images was made to recover
the spatial surface of the cortical sheet based on the white-grey matter
boundary using Brain Voyager QX 2.4 (BrainInnovation, Maastricht,
The Netherlands). We then identified the right and left DLPFC based
on the coordinates established by Sanfey et al. (2003) and Knoch et al.
(2006); x¼39, y¼ 37, z¼ 22, radius¼ 6 (Figure 1). The coordinates,
given in Talairach space, were transformed to each participant’s indi-
vidual brain space.
Biphasic TMS pulses were applied using the MagVenture R30 stimu-
lator (MagVenture A/S, Farum, Denmark) and a figure-of-eight coil
(MC-B70, inner radius 10 mm, outer radius 50 mm). The maximum
output of this coil and stimulator combination is 1.9 T and 150 A/S.
At the beginning of the first TMS session, individual resting motor
thresholds (RMTs) were determined. The mean RMT was 34.6%
(s.d.¼ 3.7), ranging from 28 to 40% of maximal stimulator output
(MSO). Stimulation intensity was applied at 110% RMT.
For sham stimulation, a figure-of-eight placebo coil (MC-BP70) was
used. This coil produced the same acoustic stimulation as the active
coil while not inducing a magnetic field. The coil was manually held
tangentially to the skull over the right/left DLPFC using the online
visualization function of Brain Voyager TMS Neuronavigation.
Participants received 15 min, 1 Hz rTMS (900 pulses) offline stimula-
tion over the left or right DLPFC. Sham stimulation was applied either
over the left DLPFC or right DLPFC, balanced over participants.
Participants were told beforehand that intensity of the TMS stimula-
tion could vary across sessions. In the debriefing, we asked participants
how the different TMS conditions might have affected their behaviour.
None of the participants indicated any directed hypotheses.
Task
Resembling the task used in Spitzer et al. (2007), two different games
were used, a standard Dictator Game (DG) and a Dictator Game with
punishment option (DGp). In both games, two players, a dictator and
a recipient, interact with each other. Each player receives an initial
endowment of 25 monetary units (MUs, 1 MU¼ 0.16 euro cents).
Additionally, the dictator receives 100 MUs and can distribute these
freely between himself and the recipient. In DG, the recipient is passive
and the game ends after the dictator has made a decision. In DGp, the
recipient can punish the dictator after being informed about the dis-
tribution. To punish the dictator, the recipient has to spend his own
MUs. For every MU the recipient uses for punishment, the dictator’s
payoff is reduced by 5 MUs. Thus, in case the dictator does not transfer
any MUs and the recipient applies maximum punishment by spending
his 25 MUs, both participants end up with 0 MUs.
Experimental procedure
Dictators and recipients were invited separately. First, 60 recipients
were invited to the BEElab (Behavioural & Experimental Economics
laboratory, Maastricht). They received written instructions about the
rules of both games (DG and DGp). In the instructions, dictators and
recipients were neutrally labelled as player A and B. To maximize the
number of observations per recipient, we implemented the so-called
strategy method (Selten, 1967). Recipients were asked how many of
their MUs they would spend for punishment for every possible transfer
the dictator could make. That is, we gathered a punishment response
for each possible dictator transfer. Importantly, this method does not
imply that punishment choices of recipients are hypothetical. The
chosen punishment is real, as it has real monetary consequences for
the recipient as well as the dictator. Specifically, depending on how
much the dictator later actually chose to transfer to the recipient, the
corresponding punishment decision was selected and final payoffs were
calculated and paid accordingly (Brandts and Charness, 2011).
Additionally a photo was taken of every recipient.
The 17 participants invited to the TMS sessions were allocated the
role of dictators. They received written instructions about the rules of
both games (DG and DGp) and were asked to answer a set of com-
prehension questions before the TMS stimulation. At the beginning of
each session, after TMS stimulation, they saw a group picture of the 20
recipients who they would be paired with in the following 20 rounds.
This was done to emphasize that in each round they interact with a
different real person and that each decision bears real consequences. In
half of the rounds, participants were paired with recipients who could
punish (DGp condition), and in the other half, they were paired with
Fig. 1 Target area for the magnetic brain stimulation. Each target was selected based on the
individual anatomical image obtained in a separate MRI measurement. The red dots represent the
two target points in Talairach space: x¼39, y¼ 37, z¼ 22.
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recipients who could not punish (DG condition). These conditions
were randomized over rounds and participants were informed about
the condition by a symbol on the computer screen. Hence, in the DG
condition, participants knew that they would not face any conse-
quences for acting selfishly, whereas in the DGp condition, punish-
ment by the recipient could decrease their payoffs substantially. In each
round, participants were asked how much, if any, of the 100 MUs they
wanted to transfer to the other participant. To avoid learning effects,
dictators received no feedback about the punishment decisions of re-
cipients until the end of the experiment. We opted for not giving
feedback because providing feedback would have had the problematic
downside that potential TMS effects on learning could not have been
disentangled from the effects we are interested in. Experienced pun-
ishment often has a larger impact on behaviour than imagined pun-
ishment. In repeated public goods game experiments with punishment,
for example, first round cooperation (imagined punishment) is often
smaller than cooperation in later rounds (experienced punishment;
Fehr and Gächter, 2000, 2002; Egas and Riedl, 2008). Thus, by
giving no feedback we are likely observing a lower bound of the
effect of (potential) punishment on dictator transfers. This means
that the incentive for acting strategically fairly is on the lower side
and, therefore, inhibiting effects of our TMS intervention are likely
to be on the conservative side too.
To test whether fairness perception or punishment beliefs were sys-
tematically affected by our TMS manipulation, participants saw five
hypothetical transfers (from 0 to 50 MUs in steps of 10) from a hypo-
thetical dictator and were asked to make fairness judgments for each
transfer. Furthermore they were asked about their punishment expect-
ation and own punishment expenses, were they in the role of the
recipient.
Decisions in both games and the elicitation of fairness perceptions,
punishment beliefs and hypothetical own punishment expenses were
completed within 5–6 min after the rTMS stimulation. For each ses-
sion, 1 of the 20 rounds was randomly selected and paid out in cash.
Participants knew about this procedure upfront and were informed
about the selected rounds and the associated earnings after the last
session.
Analysis
Dictator transfers are censored below by zero. We therefore fitted
random-intercept Tobit regressions (Gelman and Hill, 2007) to the
data using R and JAGS (see Lunn et al., 2009). In each regression
model, variables, coding the session number as well as the sequence
of the conditions were added to control for potential learning and
order effects (see Supplementary Information). To test whether par-
ticipants behave more selfishly when TMS is applied over the right
DLPFC compared with sham and TMS over the left DLPFC, transfer
decisions in the DG without punishment were regressed on dummy
predictors coding the three TMS condition (sham condition as
baseline).
To test the causal involvement of the right and/or left DLPFC in the
ability to act strategically fairly, we first classified participants into
‘adapters’ and ‘non-adapters’; those who gave more in the DGp
during sham were classified as ‘adapters’ and those who gave less or
equal were classified as ‘non-adapters’. For each participant the trans-
fer difference across DG and DGp as a measure for strategic adaption
was calculated and regressed on dummy predictors coding the three
TMS condition (sham condition as baseline) and a dummy variable
indicating whether a dictator was a non-adapter to test for changes in
strategic fairness across TMS conditions for adapters and non-adapters
separately.
RESULTS
On average, dictators transferred relatively little, although significantly
more than zero, to recipients in the DG during sham (average transfer:
6.6, one sample t-test, t(16)¼ 2.7, P < 0.05, two-sided). Transfer rates
are smaller than observed in some other DG experiments but similar to
experiments with large social distance between dictators and recipients
(Hoffman et al., 1996; Camerer, 2003). The low transfers in sham give
little room for observing the hypothesized effect of increased selfish-
ness when inhibiting the right or left DLPFC. Nevertheless, we find
that, on average, participants gave significantly less (almost 50%;
3 MUs on average) to recipients when TMS was applied to the right
DLPFC compared with TMS over the left DLPFC and sham, respect-
ively (see Figure 2; random-intercept Tobit regression, rDLPFC
dummy, 95% confidence interval (CI): 14.4 to 3.9, P < 0.05).
There was no significant difference in transfers between sham and
TMS over the left DLPFC (random-intercept Tobit regression,
lDLPFC dummy, 95% CI: 6.9 to 3.1).
To test our second hypothesis, whether the right DLPFC is also
causally involved in the ability to act strategically fairly, we analysed
the change in strategic adaption over the TMS conditions. Not all
participants showed strategic adaption during sham. Four participants
gave constantly nothing, regardless of DG and TMS condition. These
participants also reported that they did not expect any punishment
from the recipients for unfair transfers. One participant offered very
low amounts to the recipients (between 0 and 15 MUs) and did not
change offers across DG and DGp and one participant actually gave
more to recipients without punishment power (DG) than to recipients
with punishment power (DGp). However, a majority of the dictators
(11 of 17) adapted strategically during sham and were classified as
‘adapters’. On average, with sham TMS, adapters transferred 6 MUs
in DG but a 5-fold of it (32 MUs) in DGp.
Figure 3 shows how this strategic adaption was affected by the dis-
ruption of the right and left DLPFC by plotting the mean transfers of
DGp and DG for the three TMS conditions. When facing a recipient
with punishment ability, participants who adapted strategically during
sham did so significantly less when TMS was used to disrupt the right
DLPFC compared with sham (random-intercept regression, rDLPFC
TMS condition











Fig. 2 Average transfers in the DG condition. Mean transfers to recipients without the ability to
punish (DG condition) for each TMS session. Error bars show the within-subject standard errors of the
mean (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008).
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dummy, 95% CI: 8.0 to 4.6, P < 0.05). We observed the highest
strategic adaption when the left DLPFC was disrupted. However, the
difference to sham stimulation was not significant (random-intercept
regression, lDLPFC dummy, 95% CI: 0.6 to 4.3).
Most recipients were willing to use their MUs to punish unfair be-
haviour by the dictators. Consequently, by giving less to recipients with
punishment ability during TMS over the right DLPFC, dictators
earned 4.1 MUs less on average in each interaction compared with
sham (random-intercept regression, rDLPFC dummy, 95% CI: 4.7
to 3.3, P < 0.05).
In principle, it could be possible that TMS stimulation alters the
judgement of how (un)fair an offer is and/or the belief about how
likely it is that unfair offers will be punished. To test for this we
explored whether fairness judgements or beliefs about punishment
were different across the three TMS conditions. As expected, we find
that adapting dictators judge offers to be fairer the more is offered to
the recipient (random-intercept regression, offer predictor, 95% CI:
0.10 to 0.15, P < 0.05). These fairness judgements did not significantly
change across the TMS conditions (see Figure 4; random-intercept
regression, offer  left TMS, 95% CI: 0.05 to 0.02; offer  right
TMS, 95% CI: 0.04 to 0.03). Regarding punishment, during sham,
adapting dictators expected that unfair offers would be punished more
severely (see Figure 5; random-intercept regression, offer predictor, CI:
0.56 to 0.37, P < 0.05). Importantly, this expectation did not
change significantly across the TMS conditions (random-intercept
regression, offer  right, CI: 0.05 to 0.22; offer  left, CI: 0.04
to 0.22).
Hence, neither fairness judgements nor expected punishment of
adapters were significantly affected by the TMS conditions.
Interestingly, in comparison with adapters, non-adapters reported dif-
ferent fairness judgements as well as punishment beliefs. They showed
a significantly smaller increase of rated fairness for increasing offers
(random-intercept regression, non-adapter  offer, CI: 0.18 to
0.10, P < 0.05), which did not change significantly across TMS con-
ditions (random-intercept regression, non-adapter  offer  left, CI:
0.01 to 0.10; non-adapter  offer  right, CI: 0.03 to 0.08).
Compared with adapters, they also believed that dictators are punished
significantly less severely in general (random-intercept regression, non-
adapter dummy, CI: 43.87 to 15.29, P < 0.05). Thus, fairness
judgements of non-adapters were less sensitive to changes in transfers
and they generally expected less punishment.
When dictators were asked to imagine to be in the role of the re-
ceiver confronted with unfair transfers by a hypothetical dictator,
adapters reported that they would be less willing to spend their MUs
for punishment while the right DLPFC was disrupted by TMS, as
compared with sham and TMS over the left DLPFC (Figure 6,
random-intercept Tobit regression, rDLPFC dummy, 95% CI: 7.8
to 1.3, P < 0.05). Non-adapters indicated that they would punish
significantly less compared with adapters in general (random-intercept
regression, non-adapter dummy, CI: 60.1 to 4.9, P < 0.05).
transfer to a hypothetical recipient




















Fig. 4 Fairness judgments. Fairness judgments of adapters (from 1 ¼ ‘very unfair’ to 7 ¼ ‘very
fair’) for low (30) and high (40) hypothetical transfers after each TMS session (black: sham; dark
grey: TMS over the left DLPFC; light grey: TMS over the right DLPFC). Error bars show the within-
subject standard errors of the mean (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008).
transfer to a hypothetical recipient



























Fig. 5 Expected punishment. Expected punishment of adapters (from 0 to 25 punishment points) for
low (30) and high (40) hypothetical transfers after each TMS session (black: sham; dark grey:
TMS over the left DLPFC; light grey: TMS over the right DLPFC). Error bars show the within-subject
standard errors of the mean (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008).
TMS condition
















Fig. 3 Strategic adaption across TMS conditions. Mean transfers of adapters in DG (black) and DGp
(grey) across the TMS conditions. Error bars show the within-subject standard errors of the mean
(Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008).
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DISCUSSION
Our results reveal that experimental perturbation of the right, but not
the left, DLPFC systematically altered, first, the degree of prosocial
behaviour and, second, the ability to act strategically fairly. The first
result is consistent with previous findings by Knoch et al. (2006) who
studied responses to fair or selfish behaviour. We extent their finding
and show that even when subjects can actively decide to behave self-
ishly or fairly they are on average more selfish when the rDLPFC is
disrupted.
The average transfers during sham in the DG were relatively low
compared with other studies. Behaviour in the DG is known to be
sensitive to framing (List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008). Especially social dis-
tance has been shown to influence transfer rates (Hoffman et al., 1996;
Leider et al., 2009). Leider et al. (2009) showed that dictators give
significantly more to receivers that are socially close. Hoffman et al.
(1996) used a double-blind procedure that maximizes social distance
and find transfer rates of 6–8%, similar to the rates we observed in
the DG with sham TMS. In our experiment, receivers and dictators
were invited separately to the experiment, and receivers were, thus, not
present when dictators made their transfer decisions. This certainly
increased social distance between dictators and receivers and might
explain the relatively low transfers observed in our study. Further, it
has been shown that when participants have to exert effort to earn their
endowment, transfer rates decrease (Cherry et al., 2002; Oxoby and
Spraggon, 2008). In our study, dictators had to come to the lab four
times (three times more often than the receivers) and had to undergo
the TMS procedure three times. Thus, compared with the receivers, the
effort they invested was much higher, and dictators might have
thought that they deserved to keep more.
The relatively low offers of dictators in the DG with sham TMS left
little room for a decrease of offers due to disruption of the right or left
DLPFC. The fact that we nevertheless find a significant decrease in
offers after TMS over the right DLPFC in comparison with sham
TMS and TMS over the left DLPFC is reassuring for the interpretation
that the rDLPFC controls selfish impulses not only when responding to
offers (Knoch et al., 2006) but also when actively making offers.
During sham and TMS over the left DLPFC, most dictators adapted
their behaviour strategically by transferring more of their money to
recipients who were able to punish them. Similar to DG transfers, our
DGp transfers were lower than in comparable studies (Spitzer et al.,
2007; Ruff et al., 2013), and similar reasons as discussed above might
play a role. Moreover, in the DGp, participants did not receive imme-
diate feedback about punishment and, hence, could not experience but
only anticipate punishment. It is conceivable that participants thought
that punishment threats are not credible and without feedback they
could not update their beliefs. Some participants indeed reported that
they did not expect any punishment from the recipients for unfair
transfers. These participants mostly responded rationally to their be-
liefs and did not adapt their behaviour to the punishment threat. The
majority of participants, however, reported that they expected to be
punished for unfair offers and also that punishment would increase
with the unfairness of the offer. These participants also adapted their
behaviour accordingly in the sham TMS condition. However, when
disrupting the right DLPFC, the same dictators not only shared their
money less generously with recipients but also showed significantly less
strategic adaption in their unfair behaviour in case a punishment
threat was present. Thus, participants who consistently adapted their
behaviour strategically during sham and TMS over the left DLPFC
were less capable of doing so when TMS was applied to the right
DLPFC. Our study therefore provides causal evidence for the func-
tional role of the right DLPFC not only in overriding immediate selfish
impulses but also in acting strategically fairly, an ability paramount for
obeying fairness norms.
Interestingly, and in contrast to Knoch et al. (2006), where the dis-
ruption of the right DLPFC led to an increase in earnings, this lack of
adaption was maladaptive because recipients were willing to spend
their money to punish unfair behaviour, which decreased the payoff
of the dictators substantially. Hence, by disrupting the right DPLFC
participants not only failed to comply with widely shared fairness
norms but thereby also failed to maximize their own payoff.
Our results also indicate that the failure to adapt strategically is
neither explained by altered fairness perception nor by changes in be-
liefs about recipients’ punishment behaviour as suggested by Sanfey
et al. (2014). In line with previous findings (Knoch et al., 2006; Ruff
et al., 2013), fairness judgments were not significantly affected by TMS,
indicating that disrupting the right DLPFC impaired the control of
selfish impulses without altering fairness perception. This suggests that
fairness perception and decisions on complying with a fairness norm
are to some degree independently represented in the brain, enabling us
to know what is right, but do otherwise. There is also no evidence that
beliefs about recipients’ punishment behaviour were affected by our
TMS intervention. Across all three TMS conditions, participants either
believed that there would be no or little punishment (non-adapters) or
that there would be punishment and that it would increase with the
unfairness of offers (adapters). These results indicate that perturbation
of the right DLPFC can alter strategic behaviour, but not the under-
lying motive or belief system that led to strategic fairness in the first
place. Importantly, participants under TMS of the right DLPFC re-
ported that they themselves would use less money for punishing unfair
transfers. That is, although perceiving small transfers as unfair, partici-
pants in the right DLPFC TMS condition indicated not to be willing to
spend money to punish unfair behaviour of others. Consistent with the
results of Knoch et al. (2006), this suggests that even in the role of the
recipient, participants would act more selfishly by withholding costly
punishment. This implies that less social norm violations would be
punished and more selfish behaviour would be tolerated, pointing to
a possible involvement of the right DLPFC not only in norm compli-
ance but also in the enforcement of norms that demand the restriction
of selfish behaviour. Further research needs to be conducted to inves-
tigate the role of the DLPFC in norm enforcement directly.
transfer to a hypothetical recipient























Fig. 6 Own imagined punishment. Own imagined punishment of adapters (from 0 to 25 punish-
ment points) for low (30) and high (40) hypothetical transfers after each TMS session (black:
sham; dark grey: TMS over the lDLPFC; light grey: TMS over the rDLPFC). Error bars show the within-
subject standard errors of the mean (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008).
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An inherent characteristic of a within-subject design is that partici-
pants have to engage in a task repeatedly. This may lead to memory
effects or habit formation, which may influence behaviour in later
sessions. We controlled for this by counterbalancing the order of
TMS conditions and also controlled for it in our statistical analysis.
Evidence that order effects may only be of limited importance also
comes from experiments showing that when participants restart an
experimental task, behaviour is similar to the one in the previous
task. This so-called restart effect was first observed by Andreoni
(1988) and has been replicated numerous times (Andreoni and
Croson, 2008). Hence, memory effects or habit formation are unlikely
to confound our results.
Ruff et al. (2013) employed the same paradigm (DG and DGp) and
investigated differences in strategic adaption across groups of female
participants, while decreasing and increasing the neural excitability of
the right LPFC using cathodal and anodal tDCS. Using a different
intervention method and male participants, our findings are mostly
in agreement with their results. They show that strategic adaption is
significantly lower when decreasing excitability of the right LPFC,
while fairness judgements are unaffected. Transfers in the DG condi-
tion were generally higher in their sample but adaption rates were
comparable in size. Ruff et al. (2013) had an additional non-social
control condition, showing that strategic adaption is only altered in
a social context. In contrast to Ruff et al. (2013) who report an increase
in transfers in the DG when disrupting the right LPFC with cathodal
tDCS, we find that transfers to recipients who cannot punish (DG
condition) significantly decrease when disrupting the right DLPFC.
This finding is also in line with previous findings of increased selfish-
ness (Wout et al., 2005; Knoch et al., 2006; Spitzer et al., 2007) and the
subsequent interpretation of a causal role of the right DLPFC in con-
trolling selfish impulses. One possible explanation for the observed
differences to Ruff et al. (2013) may be that the spontaneous reaction
that is controlled by a secondary process is in fact not always selfish but
sometimes prosocial to some extent (Rand et al., 2013; Schulz et al.,
2014), and that this is different between male (current study) and
female participants (Ruff et al., 2013). Future research specifically de-
signed to explore these questions is needed to identify the exact role of
the right DLPFC in voluntary giving (DG). Another possible explan-
ation for the observed differences lies in the different techniques used
to stimulate/suppress neural activity (TMS vs tDCS). In addition to the
possible differences in neurophysiological effects induced by both tech-
niques, they also differ in spatial resolution, thereby potentially affect-
ing different (sub) regions within the LPFC (Priori et al., 2009).
While our study demonstrated a crucial involvement of the right
DLPFC in strategic fairness, the specific interplay of the right DLPFC
and other brain areas is not resolvable with our study design. A recent
study, combining fMRI with TMS, suggests that the DLPFC and the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) are part of a frontal cortex
network, responsible for orchestrating normative choice (Baumgartner
et al., 2011). From this perspective, and in line with other research
linking the VMPFC to the computation of abstract value signals guid-
ing simple choice (see e.g. Chib et al., 2009; Levy and Glimcher, 2011;
McNamee et al., 2013; Gross et al., 2014), one possible interpretation is
that the VMPFC is computing the expected value, integrating selfish
goals with expected punishment for violating cooperation norms,
whereas the DLPFC is linked to the execution of actions based on
this valuation.
The complex norm system we observe in human societies, which is
not present in other social animals, might be related to the fact that
phylogenetically the DLPFC is one of the latest neocortical regions
(Fuster, 2001). In a similar vein, the DLPFC is also ontogenetically
one of the latest developing brain regions (Shaw et al., 2008; Gogtay
et al., 2004), which in the context of our current findings could help to
explain why young children up to the age of 3–8 years are not able to
fully implement social rules like sharing resources with others (Fehr
et al., 2008). Taken together, our study provides strong evidence for a
direct neurobiological basis of social norm compliance, a cornerstone
for the functioning of human society.
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